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Jurisprudence, as opposed to jurisdiction is the base of judicial methods, and where, when carrying out the processes involved in the anatomy of a judgment following a Hearing, be it on paper, or following parole evidence, the judge imports reasons from a previous decision of the same court, the end result would be wrong.
This premise holds good in common law jurisdictions. The judicial methods in common law jurisdictions more often than not, accommodate discrepancies, disparities or dichotomies, on the face of the record of a previous hearing. Sadly, judges do not go behind or beyond a previous hearing, to find out the base or root of the decision made earlier. They should.
In Andre John-Salakov v. Her Majesty's Attorney General (CO3761/1999), Application to set aside All Civil Proceedings Order, in that Application the Judiciary was invited to go beyond the proceedings in the Lord Chief Justice court on November 18 1999, to around mid-1980s.
Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, is first and foremost, a piece of law that could be described as "a Judges' law" (no offence intended). The subject matter of Section 42 has remained, since the days of ALEXANDER CHAFFERS, within the competency of the Judicial Methods.
But no one can be tagged under the English Legal Jurisprudence with a string of vexatious litigation unless; the Judiciary formed the view at a point in time that such a person had instituted vexatious proceedings, habitually and persistently. In other words, sporadic or spasmodic appearances before the Courts would normally trigger a Section 42 Application
In the instant case, habitually and persistently, fall within the non sequitur doctrine. Four proceedings within a period of 40 years could not, by any stretch of any imagination qualify for habitually and persistently, within the meaning of Section 42 of the 1981 Act.
Distinguishing theory from practiceIn theory, the proceedings on November 18 1999 were initiated by the Attorney General of the day, pursuant to the then Order 94 r.15 (1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, to the following extent:
Application under section 42, Supreme Court Act 1981 (O.94, r.15) 94/15/1 Restriction of vexatious legal proceedings - Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 empowers the High Court, on the application of the Attorney General, to make an order preventing a person who has habitually and persistently instituted vexatious legal proceedings
94/15 15 (1) Every application to the High Court by the Attorney General under Section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 shall be heard and determined by a Divisional Court
(2) The application must be made by originating motion, notice of which, together with an affidavit in support, shall be filed in the Crown Office and served on the person against whom the order is sought
In practice however, the Attorney General of the day had no hands whatsoever in those proceedings. Two police officers, DS Neil Smith and DS Jim Hawkins, and a Lord Chancellor's Department civil servant, Stephen Wilcox, drugged up to their eyeballs with malice, made the application, quite improperly, in the name of the Attorney General.
Two other civil servants, who took part, one from the Treasury Solicitor Department, and the other from the Attorney General's Chamber, were simply put on a wheelbarrow and towed to the High Court, by Stephen Wilcox and the police officers, to lend some sort of juridical credibility to their mischief.
DefinitionTo reverse this process, a Judge handling a case or an application, would have to be ready, able, and willing to go beyond the date(s) of the evidential materials before the Court. In other words, the Judge would have to find out by judicial means why the previous hearing or case took place, and what were the circumstances leading up to the original application to the Court? This is where the "open mind" concept comes in or falls out of the window.
ANDRE JOHN-SALAKOV
30th March 2008
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